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Abstract 
As a central actor in shaping domestic climate policies, political parties play a vital role in 
building public support for policies aimed at mitigating climate change. However, previous 
research has neglected the role of political parties for individual climate opinion formation. This 
thesis studies the potential for political parties to lead public opinion into becoming more 
supportive of climate mitigation policies. I investigate whether party cues increase peoples’ 
willingness to take policy information that demonstrate the usefulness of climate policies into 
account in their opinion formation. I test the hypothesis that in-party cues in combination with 
policy information increase policy support with unique experimental data on two recent climate 
policy initiatives in USA and Sweden, two countries that have used considerably different 
approaches to climate change mitigation. The experimental results find no support for my 
hypotheses. While in-party cues together with policy information were not found to 
significantly increase policy support, results also indicated a lowering support when the policies 
were endorsed by out-parties. The implications of the results nuance long-standing evidence of 
elite influence on citizens’ policy opinions and question the ability of political parties to shape 
public climate policy preferences. 
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Introduction 
Despite the successful ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2015, large disagreements between 
and within countries remain about the appropriate policies to combat climate change. This 
thesis focuses on how public support for climate change policies can be fostered. The idea is 
that in order for policy designs to have their intended effect, they need to have public support. 
Public support not only grants political legitimacy but also reduces the risk of policy withdrawal 
as a consequence of government shifts (Linde, 2018b). Understanding the factors behind 
climate policy support is therefore essential for any successful implementation of policies 
aimed at mitigating climate change. The question I ask is: how do political parties shape 
citizens’ opinions toward climate policies? 
To date, research has often focused on how individuals’ values, beliefs, norms and 
ideological orientation matter for environmental policy support (Jagers et al., 2018; Steg & 
Vlek, 2009). My take on the field is to give attention to the information that citizens receive 
thanks to the political parties they identify with. I follow a stride of research suggesting that 
information can be provided by policy stances from political parties, which through political 
signaling or “cues” can help people connect their individual predispositions to reasoned and 
correct policy choices (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997, 2001; Lupia, 1994). 
Thus far, comparatively few studies have focused on the role of political parties on 
citizens’ climate policy opinions. More specifically, I identify a gap in the literature when it 
comes to whether party cues make citizens take into account information about the usefulness 
of climate policies. Through this mechanism, parties can shape citizens’ policy preferences and 
strengthen climate policy support.  
The neglected role of political parties in previous literature is surprising given that 
political parties are at the heart of democratic processes and domestic climate politics. Party 
competition shape national governments’ climate responses: domestically by the introduction 
of policy measures and internationally by providing governments with opportunities and 
constraints in international climate negotiations. Thus, political parties are in the front and 
center of climate policy-making and play an important role in shaping climate policy opinions. 
The lack of focus on political parties has been aptly summarized by Farstad (2018, p. 705), 
claiming that “it would be useful to explore whether the parties themselves shape public opinion 
on the issue by providing cues for the electorate”. 
There are good reasons to believe that cues from political parties can influence citizens’ 
climate policy opinions. Climate change is by many viewed as an abstract and distant 
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phenomenon, where perceived complexity around proper mitigation policies enhances the 
dependence of party cues, since the absence of trusted source information make the 
consequences of policy implementations unclear (Boudreau, 2009; Marx et al., 2007). 
Moreover, studies have found party identification to be an important predictor for beliefs in 
climate change and climate change attitudes (Clements, 2014; Dunlap & McCright, 2008; 
McCright & Dunlap, 2011; McCright et al., 2016; Tranter, 2011) and that elite cues affect 
public concern over climate change (Brulle et al., 2012). However, most studies in this field 
lack suitable operationalizations of party cues and a more precise focus on the role of political 
parties in the formation of policy attitudes. Given the centrality of political parties as an actor 
in shaping public policies and government responses to climate change, their prospects for 
climate leadership by shaping public policy preferences need to be further explored. 
The mechanism in focus in this thesis is that party cues will help the individual to take in 
important information on climate policies, since the party endorser is seen as a trustworthy 
source that the citizen identify with as part of his/her in-group. Or to put it differently – that 
parties are able to lead citizens to correct perceptions of the usefulness of climate policies. This 
narrows down to the question: after receiving information that presents the consequences of a 
climate policy, will the additional provision of a cue from one’s political party generate stronger 
policy support compared to when only reading policy information?  
Party cues can come in different forms and I identify two forms as interesting for this 
thesis: in-party cues and out-party cues. The idea is that when people read policy information 
that is supported by their preferred party (their in-party), the party cue will make people accept 
the substance of the information and align their opinion with their party as it is seen as a trusted 
informational source that people identify with. In contrast, when the policy is supported by a 
party people do not identify with (an out-party), they will reject the informational content and 
take an opposite position than that of the out-party through a process of out-group rejection 
(Huddy et al., 2015). Influential decision-making theories claim that the provision of additional 
information increases the complexity of political evaluations and reliance on party cues (Lau & 
Redlawsk, 2001). More recent accounts suggest that party cues lead to more effortful processing 
of policy information that motivates people to “produce arguments for the correctness of their 
party’s position” (Petersen et al., 2013). Unique survey data on two recent climate policy 
initiatives is collected from the online work marketplace Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
and among a convenience sample of Swedish citizens, where respondents from United States 
and Sweden are examined through survey experiments.  
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I test the mechanism that party cues will help individuals take in important climate policy 
information in USA and Sweden since those are two comparatively different contexts when it 
comes to climate policies. If the mechanism is found in two political contexts that have 
undertaken considerably different approaches to climate change mitigation, it would strengthen 
the generalizability of my findings. USA and Sweden differ in several important aspects that 
make the two countries suitable cases to test my expectations. Whereas USA has a bipolar 
political system with two parties structuring domestic political space, Sweden has a multi-party 
system with a larger set of parties to choose from. Moreover, in the US climate issues are subject 
to deep partisan and ideological polarization (McCright & Dunlap, 2011), and large segments 
of Republican party elites are outspoken climate deniers that repeatedly take climate policy 
positions contrary to scientific consensus. In Sweden however, political elites have long had an 
ambition to be frontrunners on climate mitigation. Despite that climate policy-related conflicts 
have recently become increasingly present (Harring & Sohlberg, 2017), the policy area has long 
been characterized by overall partisan consensus (Linde, 2018a). Additionally, the United 
States has long been reluctant to take a leadership role in the global community’s climate 
mitigation efforts and has a history of backing down from global environmental agreements 
(Pickering et al, 2018). Sweden on the other hand has been keen to take a leadership role in 
international climate negotiations and has become one of the most significant climate actors on 
the international stage (Sarasini, 2009). 
This study focuses on climate policies as the dependent variable. Previous work on 
political parties and climate opinion, mostly focusing on a US context, has considered how 
political parties shape peoples’ perceptions of the existence and threat of climate change. Less 
is known about how political parties influence public opinion to the policy instruments at the 
state’s disposal. Since partisan conflict on climate issues in most Western democracies centre 
around appropriate climate policy tools rather than the mere existence of climate change (Linde, 
2018b), I add to the literature by studying how political parties influence citizens’ opinions 
towards policies. 
The reason to choose an experimental design is that it offers a better way to study the 
impact of party cues than previous studies have accomplished. Experimental designs help 
identify causal effects that are otherwise difficult to establish. Most previous studies in the field 
of environmental politics are based on cross-sectional survey data, in which some (e.g. Linde, 
2018b, 2018a) have measured party cues by survey respondents’ perceptions of parties’ policy 
stances. That is however a sub-optimal indication that one has received a party cue (Bullock, 
2011) and is therefore difficult to measure in non-experimental research designs. As Azrout 
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and Vreese (2018, p. 387) argue: for any cues to be successful it must be exposed to people, a 
task for which cross-sectional designs are not ideal but where experiments offer a more fruitful 
approach. Experimental designs have been used in related fields, such as how general 
environmental support varies by ideological orientation (Harring & Sohlberg, 2017). To date 
however, too little work has experimentally investigated how political parties shape citizens’ 
climate policy opinions. 
This study adds theoretical knowledge to a long-standing research debate on the influence 
of political parties by providing evidence from two different contexts on a pressing political 
issue that have received limited attention by previous research. From a societal perspective, this 
study provides knowledge for political parties on how they can shape public opinion on policies 
that will become ever more relevant for fulfilling domestic and international climate ambitions.  
The implications of this study will be of benefit for scientists and policy experts, who 
often have good knowledge of the most effective policy tools but fail to gain sufficient attention 
from political parties and public opinion. If policy information would lead to higher policy 
support when presented with in-party cues, it would send a signal to those actors to engage 
more intensively with political parties to gain attention and support for policy 
recommendations. If in-party cues would fail to enhance policy support, and out-party cues 
even were to lower policy support, it would implicate that political parties face an uphill battle 
in convincing public opinion of the appropriateness of policy measures that may become 
increasingly prominent in domestic climate policy discourse. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. I first engage with previous literature 
and outline the theory of how political parties can shape public opinion on the climate, followed 
by a presentation of my experimental design. I then present the results followed by a discussion 
where I scrutinize my findings. Lastly, I conclude with a summary and suggest ideas for future 
research. 
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Theory 
In the following chapter I seek to provide an overview of the previous work in the field upon 
which I build my theoretical expectations. I start by engaging with a broad literature on how 
political parties can be expected to influence public opinion. I then focus on the varying effects 
of in-party cues and out-party cues, after which I summarize my theoretical section and present 
my hypotheses. 
Much research has shown political parties to play a fundamental role for citizens’ political 
opinions. Citizen’s opinions are not formulated in a vacuum but repeatedly shaped by the 
political context wherein the individual is required to connect her ideological predispositions 
to policy choices (Leeper & Slothuus, 2014). Political parties are at the centre of democratic 
political competition by structuring and providing policy alternatives to citizens by acting as a 
politically “mobilizing” force (Disch, 2011).  
Recent research emphasizes that political parties constitute an influential force over 
citizens’ opinions about contemporary political issues and color their perceptions of political 
reality (Carsey & Layman, 2006). While being aware of the long-standing research debate 
whether political parties lead or follow public opinion (Leeper & Slothuus, 2014), I take my 
departure in how political parties can be expected to influence public opinion as parties “have 
long been considered one of the most important determinants of mass-political behavior in 
democracies” (Brader & Tucker, 2012, p. 403). 
 
How party cues affect public opinion 
To form policy opinions and make other political choices, citizens need information that help 
them interpret the ideological consequences of different policies and to connect these choices 
to political predispositions. As many people lack any substantive knowledge or interest of 
contemporary political issues (Converse, 2006), they often take advantage of messages from 
political parties to form their policy preferences without performing the cognitively demanding 
task of paying close attention to politics. Such messages are commonly known as party cues 
(Bullock, 2011). Party cues contain pieces of information that link political parties to a policy 
position. Thus, party cues “provide explicit information about which political party (or parties) 
supports or opposes a given policy” (Leeper & Slothuus, 2014, p. 135). 
Party cues give individuals a simple and efficient way to figure out the “correct” position 
on policy issues that is in line with individual predispositions, such as their ideological 
preferences. Thus, political parties are “an opinion-forming agency of great importance” 
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(Campbell et al., 1960, p. 128) that provide a simple basis through which people can evaluate 
policy proposals. Downs (1957) early argued that citizens rely on cues as pieces of information 
from political parties to draw conclusions on which parties that best serve their political 
interests, simply because they abstain from searching for additional information on their own. 
Hence, party cues work as heuristic “shortcuts” that contain just enough information that help 
citizens reach satisfactory policy conclusions (Goren et al., 2009; Leeper & Slothuus, 2014).  
A key aspect of the party cue literature is that cues can help citizens form opinions as if 
they were in possession of enough information or knowledge about politics. Influential work 
emphasize that people with lower policy knowledge use cues to form as good decisions as those 
with higher levels of policy knowledge (Lupia, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). Party cues 
has subsequently been shown to increase the propensity of “correct” voting, i.e. a “choice which 
would be made under conditions of full information” (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997, p. 586). Bullock 
(2011, p. 497) notes that citizens can use party cues “to infer other information, and, by 
extension, to make decisions”. Thus, party cues may not only help people align their policy 
positions with that of their preferred party, but also help citizens to make further sense of the 
policies that parties endorse. Hence, party cues can be utilized by citizens to enhance their 
political understanding without possessing specific policy details (Leeper & Slothuus, 2014).  
To illustrate how a cuing process can work in the context of climate policy, consider the 
up until recently heated debate in Swedish politics over a tax on aviation. The Social 
Democrat/Green Party government coalition introduced the aviation tax in 2018 to reduce air 
travel and emissions of aviation traffic. In contrast, the right-wing opposition parties criticized 
the tax as they argued that it would be ineffective. Deciding whether to support or oppose the 
aviation tax would be a challenging task for many voters, that would include an estimation of 
the policy’s effectiveness as well as trade-offs between different values. Instead, an efficient 
way for most people to reach an adequate policy opinion would be to adopt the policy position 
of their preferred party. It could therefore be expected that supporters of the red-green 
government coalition parties would support the aviation tax, while supporters of the right-wing 
opposition parties would oppose it. 
Climate change policies is a policy area where party cues can be expected to be 
particularly important for citizens’ opinions. The scientific complexity of climate change and 
the uncertain effects of policies aimed at mitigating its consequences can lead people to dismiss 
policy-related information that is not provided by a trusted source (Marx et al., 2007). Instead, 
cues from political parties are by most people perceived as a trusted source of information, that 
may more strongly shape people’s policy opinions that information without a clear source 
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(Brulle et al., 2012). This is in line with suggestions that citizens become more dependent on 
party cues on more complex policy issues and difficult policy decisions (Boudreau, 2009; 
Nicholson, 2012). As climate change by many still is perceived as a rather abstract and distant 
phenomenon of which the consequences are difficult to foresee, this would be a typical policy 
area where citizens will rely more heavily on party cues. In such instances, political parties may 
thus be even more influential when citizens form their policy opinions. 
Recently, in times where competing political information is more accessible and complex 
than ever (Druckman, 2015), the prediction that party cues will become more influential has 
gained empirical attention. Following from this, a common presumption is that when citizens 
face detailed issue descriptions on policies, party cues will become even more important 
(Druckman & Lupia, 2016). In the seminal work of Lau and Redlawsk, they argue that cues 
“should be relied upon more heavily in more cognitively complex situations” (Lau & Redlawsk, 
2001, p. 955), i.e.  in situations where citizens have to consider a varying amount of details 
about policies or political candidates. Ultimately, this task makes citizens turn to party cues as 
a coping strategy to deal with information overload. They theorize, and find, that the provision 
of more details about political candidates increases the reliance of party cues compared to 
settings with less candidate information (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). The most important takeaway 
from their work is that cues, regardless of political knowledge, are used by most people in their 
formation of policy judgements. 
Additional work underlines that party cues remain a predictor of opinion in more complex 
decision processes. Cohen (2003) found that citizens’ motivations to stay loyal to their political 
party outweighed motivations to form policy beliefs consistent with their ideological 
orientations. When party cues were given in combination with details about mock welfare 
policies, subjects aligned their policy position with that of their preferred party regardless of 
the content of the policy (Cohen, 2003). In line with Cohen’s seminal work, similar evidence 
by Rahn (1993) and Arceneaux (2008) suggest that people follow cues from their parties even 
in situations where policy suggestions and statements are counter-stereotypical from parties’ 
ideological reputation. Even though recent work suggest that citizens’ opinions are at least as 
much affected by objective policy content as by party cues (Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2014; 
Bullock, 2011), abovementioned research findings underline that political parties’ policy 
positions are of great importance when citizens structure their policy preferences. 
Overall, abovementioned research has produced considerable evidence that political 
parties can influence citizens’ opinions in the way that party cues make citizens align their 
policy preferences with those of their preferred party. However, an important question that 
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arises from this assumption is how citizens respond to messages from other parties. Recent 
work in this regard suggest that party cues have different effects on citizens with different 
partisan stripes. 
 
The different effects of in- and out-party cues 
Why do party cues work as shortcuts? A dominant perspective in research suggests that political 
parties are a central and durable part of a citizen’s identity (Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 
2002) that provide people the opportunity to characterize themselves and political 
representatives who share their party identification as in-group members. Subsequently, 
political representatives who do not share the party identification (i.e. people who identifies 
with other parties) are characterized as out-group members (Huddy et al., 2015; Nicholson, 
2012).  
Party cues activate and accentuate such identities. When processing a party cue, it is 
expected that the individual’s party identification “raises a perceptual screen through which the 
individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation” (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 
133). Thus, individuals evaluate political information from parties they identify with favorably 
as they are considered part of the in-group, while information from other parties are evaluated 
unfavorably since those parties are considered as out-groups (Huddy et al., 2015). The essence 
of this perspective has been aptly summarized by Azrout and Vreese (2018, p. 336), saying that 
”individuals consider members of the party they identify with to be viewed as members of the 
in-group and thus are shown a positive bias, whereas members of another party are considered 
members of an out-group and are consequently shown a negative bias”. 
This account could be understood through the theory of motivated reasoning (e.g. 
Druckman et al., 2013; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010). The theory holds that citizens utilize party 
cues to stimulate “directional” goals, which motivate them to form opinions that are in line with 
their existing beliefs and political identities (Taber & Lodge, 2006). When interpreting new 
information, cognitive responses make people systematically process policy content so it is 
consistent with prior views and counterargue political information that contradict existing 
opinions. Party cues therefore color citizens’ interpretations of the substance of policy 
information (Bolsen et al., 2014). The party endorsement makes citizens base their policy 
evaluations on whether they trust the source of the information and how they interpret the facts 
at hand (Bisgaard & Slothuus, 2018). Specifically, if people read political information that is 
sponsored by their in-party, people should pay closer attention to the content and assess it more 
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favorably as it is endorsed by their in-party. In contrast, when the content is sponsored by an 
out-party, citizens will read through the policy substance with a negative bias, which lead to a 
less favorable policy opinion. Thus, people take use of in-party cues to think through the policy 
substance and toe the party line, while simultaneously reject the informational content and take 
the opposite position when it is supported by out-parties (Petersen et al., 2013).  
This explanation has recently received considerable empirical attention. For instance, 
Druckman et al. (2013) demonstrated that party cues made people more likely to follow in-
party endorsements on energy and immigration policy, even if the endorsement contradicted 
the party’s ideological reputation and strong policy arguments for the opposite position. 
However, when the exact same information was endorsed by the out-party, people took the 
opposite position to mark distance from the out-party. Others have also found cues from out-
parties to be as influential for people’s policy opinions as cues from in-parties (Goren et al., 
2009; Nicholson, 2012). Therefore, the ability of political parties to shape public opinion is not 
limited to in-party cues but is just as likely to take place in the presence of out-party cues. 
Hence, people of different partisan stripes can be expected to react differently to different 
party cues. When reading information about a new policy proposal, we can therefore expect 
that peoples’ policy opinions will be shaped by the party that supports the policy. When a person 
read a cue from their preferred party, they will pay attention to the content of the information 
and form a policy opinion that is in line with their party’s opinion. In contrast, if a person read 
a cue from an out-party, they will reject the informational content and form an opposite opinion 
than that of the out-party. In terms of climate policies, when a left-wing party indicate their 
support for a climate policy proposal, people with left-wing party preferences can be expected 
to accept the message and be more supportive of the policy, while people with right-wing party 
preferences will reject the message and be less supportive of the policy. 
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Theoretical summary and hypotheses 
Previous research has provided much insights into how party cues affect the policy preferences 
of citizens. Based on previous work cited there are strong theoretical reasons to expect that 
party cues can enhance citizen support for climate policies. Party cues have been found to be a 
major source for which people structure their policy opinions (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Lupia, 
1994). In the case of climate change, previous work provides even more compelling reasons to 
expect that political parties shape the policy opinions of citizens. The inherent complexities 
around climate change policies can be expected to increase people’s dependence on party cues 
when forming their policy attitudes (Boudreau, 2009; Nicholson, 2012). Therefore, when 
people are being presented with information on a climate policy proposal without a clear source, 
it can make people uncertain and fail to update peoples’ policy preferences. In contrast, when 
reading information endorsed by a political source it can be expected to significantly shape 
citizens’ opinions of the policy. 
We could therefore expect that people become more supportive of climate policies when 
they read policy information that is endorsed by their political party. The idea is that when 
people read policy information endorsed by a party they identify with (their in-party), the cue 
will make them read policy information with a partisan lens, which enhances the probability 
that they take the policy information into account and process the policy content to reach a 
policy conclusion that is consistent with their party’s position. My first expectation (H1) is 
therefore that citizens provided with policy information and in-party cues will have a higher 
level of climate policy support than citizens that are provided with only policy information. 
Further, I test how citizens respond to policy information that is endorsed by an out-party. 
Recall that a core theoretical expectation from previous research is that people form policy 
opinions that correspond with their party’s position. However, when reading policy 
recommendations supported by out-parties, people are expected to reject the content of the 
information and take an opposite policy stance (Bisgaard & Slothuus, 2018; Campbell et al., 
1960). We could therefore expect that people of different partisan stripes will react differently 
to different party cues. In the US, Democrats could be expected to be significantly less 
supportive when the policy is supported by Republicans, and Republicans could be expected to 
be significantly less supportive when the policy is supported by Democrats. In Sweden, left-
wing party supporters could be expected to be significantly less supportive with a Moderate 
Party cue, while right-wing supporters could be expected to be significantly less supportive 
with a Social Democrat cue. 
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Hence in both countries, we can expect negative effects of party cues among both left-wing 
respondents and right-wing respondents when the policy information is endorsed by an out-
party. My second expectation (H2) is therefore that citizens provided with policy information 
and out-party cues will have a lower level of climate policy support than citizens that are 
provided with only policy information. 
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Study design 
I conduct survey experiments to test my hypotheses. Experimental designs offer a powerful tool 
for theory testing  as it allows for a sharp distinction between cause and effect by which we can 
determine causality (Mullinix et al., 2015). I manipulate the survey to create variance to study 
if the adding of treatment stimuli (party cues, policy information or a combination of the two) 
has the hypothesized effects on climate policy support.  
With the experimental approach I make sure that respondents actually are exposed to 
party cues and study if cues shape climate policy support. Experimental designs in political 
science “are increasingly seen as a preferred method of discovery and inference” (Druckman & 
Lupia, 2012, p. 1178), and are frequently used by scholars to explain how variations in the 
presentations of political phenomena affect policy opinions among diverse citizen populations 
(Druckman & Lupia, 2012).  
While experiments offer a powerful facilitation of causal inference, they are however not 
without weaknesses. First and foremost, experiments study people, where the prospects for 
external validity and generalizability may be hindered if study objects are not representative for 
the population the experiment seeks to say something about. Furthermore, experiments include 
constructed situations that may not always be as close to reality as preferred, which hamper 
replication possibilities as well as chances of finding similar effects in a real-world setting. To 
construct experimental manipulations as close to reality as possible is therefore an important 
part of any experimental study. 
To enhance external validity and test whether my expectations are found in different 
political contexts, I collect data on citizens from two countries – USA and Sweden. As 
previously mentioned, I use USA and Sweden since those are two comparatively different 
political environments, both in terms of political systems and partisan polarization but also 
when it comes to how partisan elites and citizens have addressed and prioritized climate policy 
issues at domestic and international level. If my expectations about the influence of political 
parties hold across two political contexts that have undertaken considerably different 
approaches to climate change mitigation, it would strengthen the generalizability of my 
findings. In the next section I describe the experimental design which was very similar in the 
two studies. 
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Study 1: USA 
For the US study, I conducted a survey experiment and recruited American respondents on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online crowdsourcing platform that has become 
increasingly popular in the social sciences for conducting survey experiments to a low cost 
directed toward heterogeneous samples (Paolacci, 2010). MTurk uses an opt-in sample, where 
subjects self-select to participate. The sample is thus not a population-based sample. While 
population-based samples are preferable in terms of representativeness, opt-in samples results 
have been found to often replicate studies with population-based samples (Mullinix et al., 
2015).  
Experimental subjects recruited from MTurk have not been found to systematically differ 
from population-based subjects when taking standard social and political characteristics into 
account (Levay et al., 2016). Empirical studies find that causal effects estimates do not 
significantly differ between self-selected convenience samples and population-based samples, 
which is “reassuring for those who have little choice but to rely on cheaper convenience 
samples” (Mullinix et al., 2015, p. 123). This being said, there is also work strengthening the 
view that non-population based sampling is problematic also for experimental conclusions 
(Mutz, 2011; see also Yeager et al., 2011). Given that the use of a population-based sample is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, the MTurk infrastructure provide an effective way to draw 
causal inferences on a sample of US citizens.  
850 participants were recruited from MTurk on 8 April 2019. To safeguard the data I 
decided to exclude observations from repeated IP addresses as well as non-American GPS 
coordinates1, information that was provided from the survey tool. After this procedure, 747 
respondents remained in the dataset. As the study focuses on people identifying with a political 
party, the analysis was concentrated to respondents identifying as Democrats or Republicans  
(n = 554).2 
Finding a suitable policy to study on American subjects was not easy given the deep 
political polarization on climate issues. I took inspiration from Druckman et al. (2013) and 
sought for issues that: 1) had received recent attention, 2) where public opinion due to the 
policy’s recent introduction may not be very crystallized, and 3) where parties or its 
                                                   
1 This procedure is conducted in light of recent alarms of contaminated survey data on MTurk, mainly generated by bots that 
produce automatic survey responses (Kennedy et al., 2018). To try to prevent potential bots I included a Captcha provided from 
the survey software Qualtrics. A Captcha is a small test that is easy for humans to solve and is commonly used to separate 
humans from bots. 
  
 
2 See the results chapter for a separate analysis of Independents (n=193). 
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representatives do not hold dramatically different positions. The last point is difficult to adjust 
for given abovementioned caveats, why I looked for a climate policy where representatives 
from both parties had sponsored the policy when introduced in the House of Representatives.  
I opted for a policy initiative from autumn 2018, that suggested the introduction of a 
carbon tax at the federal level - the “Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act” (EICDA). 
EICDA was introduced by two Republicans and three Democrats, the first bipartisan carbon 
pricing proposal introduced in the House of Representatives in nearly a decade (Columbia 
University, 2018). The policy would charge fossile fuel companies with $15 per ton carbon 
emitted, a fee that would increase by $10 every year afterward, a much steeper increase in 
comparison to other carbon pricing proposals (Columbia University, 2018). The tax revenue 
would be distributed back to households in form of dividends to cover expected increases in 
utility costs. While similar policies have faced staunch opposition from Republican party elites, 
EICDA was initiated by members of the bipartisan Climate Solutions Caucus, consisting of 45 
Republicans and 45 Democrats, and included provisions specifically aimed for attracting 
Republican support. The bill was applauded by environmental groups as well as the 
Republican-leaning Climate Leadership Council (The Hill, 2018). 
 
 
Procedure 
In a next step I designed the experimental conditions. After reading initial information about 
the motivation of the study and answering questions on standard social variables as well as on 
party identification3, subjects were randomly assigned4 into one of four different groups. Group 
1 constituted the control condition, where subjects read a short text about a recent climate policy 
proposal that had been introduced by legislators. 
“Next, we would like to know your opinion about a recent climate policy proposal. The Energy Innovation and 
Carbon Dividend Act is a recently introduced bill by politicians to put a national price on carbon.” 
Subjects in the control condition received only this information, followed by a measure of the 
dependent variable described below. In group 2, subjects read the same message as group 1, 
but were also provided with policy information. To ensure external validity and to avoid 
deception, I opted for real policy information retrieved from a non-partisan source – Center on 
                                                   
3 See appendix D for exact formulations of these questions in the survey. 
4 I programmed the two surveys in the survey software program Qualtrics. Qualtrics has a built-in randomization tool that 
allows for random assignment between experimental conditions. See appendix C for detailed randomization checks. 
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Global Energy Policy at Columbia University (Columbia University, 2018). Shortly after 
EICDA was introduced in the House of Representatives, the Centre assessed EICDA’s expected 
environmental contribution and provided estimates of EICDA’s expected impact on carbon 
emissions and energy market structures. In group 2, subjects read the following message (policy 
information in bold here for presentational purposes): 
“Next, we would like to know your opinion about a recent climate policy proposal. The Energy Innovation and 
Carbon Dividend Act is a recently introduced bill by politicians to put a national price on carbon. The bill would 
set a carbon price for fossil fuel companies at $15 per ton of carbon emissions and increasing the price by 
$10 every year, while 100% of the revenues would be returned to American households. According to 
research, the policy would reduce US carbon emissions by 45 percent by 2030 and up to 80 percent by 2050, 
compared to 2015, as well as abolish the use of coal in the US electricity system by 2030.” 
Subjects in group 3 and 4 read the same message as subjects in group 2, but also received party 
cues, operationalized here as information that the policy had been supported by Democrats or 
Republicans. Subjects in the Republican cue condition (group 3) read that the policy was 
supported by Republicans, while subjects in the Democrat cue condition (group 4) read that the 
policy was supported by Democrats. While I randomly assign respondents, natural variation in 
the subjects’ partisan orientation make it possible to discern the effects of party cues when 
policy information is held constant and to test the hypotheses. Will Democrats who read a party 
endorsement become more positive when the policy is supported by Democrats (H1) and less 
supportive when it is supported by Republicans (H2)? In a similar way, will Republicans who 
read a Republican party cue become more supportive of the policy when they see that their own 
party supports it (H1) and less so when the policy is supported by Democrats (H2)? Using 
different party cues and sustaining a natural variation of subject’s party identification ensure a 
test for which parties that can lead public opinion and how the provision of in- and out-party 
cues affect policy support (Nicholson, 2012). In groups 3 and 4, subjects read the following 
message (party cues in bold for presentational purposes): 
“Next, we would like to know your opinion about a recent climate policy proposal. The Energy Innovation and 
Carbon Dividend Act is a recently introduced bill by [Republicans/Democrats] to put a national price on carbon. 
The bill would set a carbon price for fossil fuel companies at $15 per ton of carbon emissions and increasing the 
price by $10 every year, while 100% of the revenues would be returned to American households. According to 
research the policy, [that is supported by Republicans/Democrats], would reduce US carbon emissions by 45 
percent by 2030 and up to 80 percent by 2050, compared to 2015, as well as abolish the use of coal in the US 
electricity system by 2030.” 
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Study 2: Sweden 
I designed a similar survey experiment for the Swedish study. As MTurk is primarily a platform 
for US participants where the amount of Swedish respondents is minimal (Pavlick et al., 2014), 
I used a different data collection strategy. Instead, the Swedish survey was distributed on social 
media (Facebook and Twitter) and through email among students at the Department of Political 
Science and Department of Psychology at the University of Gothenburg.  
Using mainly students as opt-in samples is an issue of debate in the literature given the 
quest of performing experimental studies with high external validity. While many experimental 
studies use student samples out of convenience, the generalizability of their results is often 
discussed and have faced skepticism, but also praise by previous research (see Druckman & 
Kam, 2009 for a review). 298 Swedish respondents were recruited between 8th April and 26th 
April 2019. 269 persons completed the survey. As with the American sample, I excluded 
respondents that did not identify with a party (5 respondents) from further analysis. 
The climate policy in focus for the Swedish study was a recently introduced tax system 
for new cars, implemented by the Social Democrat/Green Party coalition government as of 1 
July 2018 – the bonus-malus policy. Bonus-malus is a financial instrument where the more 
environmentally friendly options within a group of products are subsidized by the more 
environmentally harmful product options (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018). The policy is part of 
the Swedish government’s efforts to reduce emissions in the transport sector, which is 
responsible for one third of total emissions in Sweden (Regeringskansliet, 2017). The system 
entails that new vehicles with low Co2 emissions (e.g. electric cars) will qualify for a bonus at 
purchase, while new vehicles with high Co2 emissions (e.g. petrol and diesel cars) will be taxed 
at a higher rate for the first three years. 
The choice of policy in the Swedish case was guided by the same criteria as in the US 
study.  The bonus-malus policy was one of the few concrete climate policy issues discussed in 
the 2018 election campaign, making the issue relatively salient in the political debate. Despite 
this, a majority of Swedes (63%) reported to not understand the bonus-malus concept in the 
election campaign (Novus, 2018) This indicates that public opinion on the issue may not be 
very crystallized, meaning that there is room for movement in peoples’ policy opinions. 
Moreover, the policy constitutes a “carrot and stick” design, which could be credibly perceived 
as a policy approach where parties on both sides of the left-right political spectrum could be 
seen as policy supporters. While both the Red-Greens and most right-wing opposition parties 
expressed overall support for the policy, the right-wing parties simultaneously criticized the 
policy for being too harsh on high polluting vehicles, not being technique neutral and in its 
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present form have limited climate impact (Riksdagen, 2016). Last, by opting for a policy that 
has been supported on both sides of the political aisle I avoided the ethical problem by 
presenting subjects with untrue or deceptive information or asking subjects to consider a 
hypothetical scenario (Desposato, 2018). 
 
 
Procedure 
In the Swedish study, subjects first read initial information about the motivation of the study 
and answered questions on standard social variables as well as party identification5. After that, 
subjects were randomly assigned into one of four experimental groups. Group 1 constituted the 
control condition, where subjects read a short text about a recent climate policy proposal that 
had been introduced by legislators. 
“Next, I am interested in your opinion on a recent climate policy proposal. Some politicians have proposed a 
bonus-malus system for new cars, which means that new cars are taxed based on their levels of emissions.” 
Subjects in the control condition received only this information, followed by a measure of the 
dependent variable described below. Subjects randomly assigned to group 2 read the same 
above message as group 1 but were also provided with policy information. Again, inspired by 
previous work (Rhodes et al., 2014), I opted for policy information retrieved from public 
investigations, government agencies and independent research organizations that assessed the 
policy’s estimated environmental impacts.6 The information provided for subjects in group 2 
read the following (policy information in bold for presentational purposes): 
“Next, I am interested in your opinion on a recent climate policy proposal. Some politicians have proposed a 
bonus-malus system for new cars, which means that new cars are taxed based on their levels of emissions. 
According to the proposal, new cars with no or relatively low carbon emissions will be rewarded with a 
bonus of maximum SEK 60,000, while new petrol and diesel cars with relatively high carbon emissions will 
receive an increased vehicle tax during the first three years. According to research, the proposal will reduce 
emissions from new cars at a faster rate than before and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by four million 
tonnes and nitrogen oxide emissions by three thousand tonnes by 2030.” 
                                                   
5 See appendix E/F for exact formulations of these questions in the survey. 
6 The information was collected from studies conducted by the Swedish Transport Agency (Transportstyrelsen), the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (Naturvårdsverket, 2017), the Swedish Environmental Research Institute (Åström et al., 
2016), as well as the governmental investigation for the policy (SOU 2016:33, 2016). 
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As in the US study, subjects randomly assigned to groups 3 and 4 received party cues. In the 
Swedish study, subjects in these groups read either a Social Democratic cue or a Moderate Party 
cue, where either party indicated their policy support. I focused on cues from the two major 
parties in Swedish politics. Even though Sweden is a multi-party system with eight parties 
currently represented in parliament, the two parties typically gain between one-third and one-
fifth of the votes in national elections. Moreover, they are traditionally the leading parties in 
government coalitions, which is the key player in shaping a country’s climate policy agenda. 
The two parties have for decades been the main competitors in Swedish politics and their 
longevity have provided their party labels with a clear reputational value that makes more 
established parties more able to lead public opinion (Brader et al., 2013).  
Using the major government and opposition party makes sense given recent changes in 
Swedish politics, where the centre-right Alliance has split at the national level after the Centre 
Party and the Liberals entered a budget cooperation with the Social Democrat/Green Party 
government coalition. Moreover, using cues from the major parties on different sides of the 
left-right political spectrum provides an experimental advantage. If we find similar effects of 
party cues regardless of party sponsor, it suggests that party cue effects are not limited to parties 
with a specific ideological profile and that parties with different policy reputations on climate 
issues can lead public opinion in a more positive direction (Bisgaard & Slothuus, 2018).  
As in the US study, it also makes it possible to study the expectation that people of 
different partisan stripes react differently to different cues. Will left-wing7 (right-wing) party 
supporters process the information and become more supportive of the policy when reading 
that the Social Democrats (the Moderates) support the policy (H1)? And in contrast, will they 
reject the informational content and be less supportive when the policy is supported by the 
Moderates (the Social Democrats) (H2)? 
 
Subjects in groups 3 and 4 read the following message: 
“Next, I am interested in your opinion on a recent climate policy proposal. [The Moderates/The Social 
Democrats] has proposed a bonus-malus system for new cars, which means that new cars are taxed based on their 
levels of emissions. According to the proposal, new cars with no or relatively low carbon emissions will be 
                                                   
7 Despite the abovementioned split of the Alliance at the national level, I choose to mainly present the Swedish results clustered 
by left-wing party supporters (the Social Democrats, the Left Party, the Green Party) and right-wing party supporters (the 
Moderates, the Centre Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals). I do this in light of the relative small sample size in the 
Swedish study, but also that recent studies confirm the presence of ”bloc identification”, where ”the existence of multiple 
parties and coalitions may blur loyalty to a single party” (Huddy et al., 2018, p. 190). 
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rewarded with a bonus of maximum SEK 60,000, while new petrol and diesel cars with relatively high carbon 
emissions will receive an increased vehicle tax during the first three years. According to research the proposal, 
[that is supported by the Moderates/the Social Democrats], will reduce emissions from new cars at a faster rate 
than before and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by four million tonnes and nitrogen oxide emissions by three 
thousand tonnes by 2030.” 
Table 1 outlines the four groups included in the two survey experiments and the stimuli the 
different experimental groups received. As described above, group 1 constituted the control 
condition where subjects receive neither a party cue nor policy information. Group 2 received 
no party cue but policy information about the policy’s estimated effects, whereas groups 3 and 
4 received both cues from political parties and policy information. As I focus on whether the 
inclusion of party cues make people more supportive of climate policies, groups 3 and 4 provide 
a possibility to discern if the combined information (party cue + policy information) 
significantly increase and/or decrease policy support compared to groups 1 and 2.  
 
Table 1: Experimental treatments and groups 
 
Group 1 (control) Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
No cue or information x 
   
Policy information only 
 
x 
  
Right party cue + policy information 
  
x 
 
Left party cue + policy information 
   
x 
     
 
In order to draw valid conclusions about treatment effects we need to assess the necessary 
statistical power, i.e. the likelihood to reject the null hypothesis that no systematic differences 
exist between the experimental groups. As a standard reference point in the literature is 90% 
statistical power (Sundell, 2012), the fulfillment of a small effect size (η2 = .02 (Cohen, 1992)) 
would require a recruitment of at least 230 respondents in both experiments, a number well 
above a minimum threshold for meaningful mean comparisons in experimental studies 
(Esaiasson et al., 2017). The power analysis and minimum sample size was calculated using 
G* Power analysis 3.1, a commonly used power analysis software tool (Faul et al., 2007). 
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I performed a randomization check for the US and Swedish studies to ensure that there 
was no unwarranted variation in the four groups that was not related to the experimental stimuli. 
The results from repeated one-way ANOVAs (see tables in appendix C) found that all F-ratios 
were small and insignificant, besides for ideological orientation in the US sample (p=0.029). 
Overall however, there were no systematic errors in the group assignment which strengthen the 
internal validity of my experiments.  
In terms of reliability, the Swedish sample was rather low and showed that approximately 
three quarters of the sample identified with one of the three red-green parties. While this aptly 
illustrates the potential hazards of self-selected convenience samples it simultaneously indicates 
that the results among Swedish right-wing respondents should be treated more cautiously 
relative to the ones in the American study. A call for restraint is therefore in order when 
assessing the Swedish results. 
 
Measures 
In the pre-treatment survey, I followed previous work from the US by measuring party 
identification in two ways. The first measure simply asked subjects if they identified themselves 
as a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent (0=Democrat, 1=Republican, 2=Independent). 
To capture the level of attachment to their respective party, subjects also responded to a 7-point 
Likert scale that asked, “What option on the scale best describes your party identification?” 
where 1 = “Strong Democrat” and 7 = “Strong Republican”, grouping leaning partisans and 
partisans together as previous work have found them to behave similarly (e.g. Bullock, 2011; 
Levendusky, 2010). Ideology was measured with a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = “Very 
liberal” to 7 = “Very conservative”. As Sweden is a multi-party system, I measured party 
identification in the Swedish study by asking subjects what party they feel closest, as well as 
their level of attachment to that party (1 = Not very closely, 2 = Somewhat closely, 3 = Very 
closely), while ideology ranged from 1 = “Clearly to the left” to 10 = “Clearly to the right”.  
Since any experiment that concerns party cues face the risk of priming party identification 
on subjects, i.e. that pre-treatment survey questions about party identification make people base 
their opinions on that identification (Druckman et al., 2013), the questions on the respondent’s 
political leanings were asked first in the survey, followed by standard demographical variables 
that tend to influence attitudes, such as gender, age, income and education level (Montgomery 
et al., 2018).  
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Appropriate post-treatment measures were presented to subjects immediately after the 
experimental treatments in the two studies. My central dependent variable, climate policy 
support, was operationalized straightforwardly. Subjects in the American study were asked: 
“Given the information you just read, what is your opinion about the Energy Innovation and 
Carbon Dividend Act?”. Subjects in the Swedish study were asked: “Given the information you 
just read, what is your opinion about the bonus-malus policy for new cars?”.  
Subjects indicated their support on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = “strongly oppose” to 
7 = “strongly support” (4 = “Neither oppose nor support”). The dependent variable mimic 
outcome variables used in previous studies (e.g. Bolsen et al., 2014). The survey was ended by 
a control question to see whether subjects had paid attention to the text. The question asked 
they if the policy they just read about was supported by any political party. This question helped 
me discern whether policy support in the four groups differed between those who responded 
correctly to the control question and those who did not. The results from such an analysis found 
no differences between respondents that answered correctly on the attention question and 
respondents who did not, which strengthen the reliability of my findings (Montgomery et al., 
2018). 
I use ANOVA to discern whether the four experimental groups in my two experiments 
have any mean differences in policy support. ANOVA uses an F-test to test for differences 
between more than two independent means (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017: 40). Since 
ANOVA only indicate if a group is significantly different from another, I use a Tukey post-hoc 
test to discern which of the four groups that have significantly different means. In a further 
analysis, I use OLS regressions with interaction terms to graphically display how citizens react 
to in- and out-party cues. 
 
Ethical considerations 
An important aspect of my experimental studies concerns the ethics. Empirical examinations 
of citizen attitudes towards social science experiments show that citizens do find survey 
experiments rather unproblematic, but at the same time express more opposition to 
experimental participation without having expressed consent (Desposato, 2018; Naurin & 
Öhberg, 2019). To escape any potential ethical violations, I opt for presenting real policy 
information that has been generated by politically unaffiliated sources as well as providing party 
cues that do not decept people into taking policy considerations under the influence of false 
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party positions. In this way I not only minimize potential ethical issues but also strengthen the 
study’s external validity and empirical contribution. 
Another ethical aspect concerns the use of the MTurk platform, as sub-minimum wage 
income from the site is the only source of income for many workers (Pew Research Center, 
2016). While MTurk provides an excellent platform for social scientists to collect data in a 
cheap and relatively effortless way, scholars have faced criticism for being too cheap with their 
payments. An empirical study found the median hourly wage for MTurk workers to be 
approximately $2/hour, while only four percent of MTurk workers earned more than the federal 
minimum income (Hara et al., 2017). To ensure that survey respondents were appropriately 
paid, I set the payment at $1.20 per respondent, which I found reasonable given the short 
amount of time to finish the survey (around 3 minutes) and the present US federal minimum 
wage level ($7.25/hour) (United States Department of Labor, 2018). 
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Results 
Study 1: USA 
Figure 1 display the means in support for the carbon tax between respondents identifying 
as Democrats or Republicans (n = 554)8. Democrats in all experiment groups were significantly 
more positive to a carbon tax than Republicans. However, the results in this study did not 
provide support for H1. Starting with Democrats, the means displayed in figure 1 find that in-
party cues had no positive effects on policy support. The mean for Democrats in who got in-
party cues and policy information was 5.59, while the mean for Democrats who got only policy 
information was 5.67. The lower mean in the in-party group compared to the information only 
group goes against theoretical expectations.  
A Tukey post-hoc test9 analyzing which groups that significantly differ from each other 
reveal that mean differences between the in-party cue group and information only group were 
statistically insignificant (t=-0.36, p=0.984). While no statistically significant differences 
emerged, the means found that Democrats in groups 2 (information) and 4 (in-party cue and 
information) had approximately half a scale step higher policy support compared to Democrats 
in the control group. In fact, the mean difference between the control group and the information 
only group balances on the edge of statistical significance (t=2.48, p=0.064). Thus, while 
Democrats responded rather positively to policy information, in-party cues in combination with 
policy details did not translate into higher policy support among these party supporters. 
Turning to Republicans, the bars for Republican subjects in figure 1 display strikingly 
small mean differences between the four experimental groups. These results provide further 
evidence of no support for H1 in this study. Republicans who got in-party cues and policy 
information had a higher mean (4.08) than Republicans who only got policy information (3.98), 
but the differences were not statistically significant (t=0.28, p=0.992). Thus, the results also 
among Republicans speak against the expectation that in-party cues and policy information 
enhance climate policy support. It was also the case that Republicans in the control group had 
equal mean tax support as Republicans getting both in-party cues and information. Thus, the 
findings among both Democrats and Republicans find no support for H1 in the US case. 
 
                                                   
8 I reran the analyses with only those respondents who answered correctly on the attention check question (n = 458). The results 
from the separate analyses were not different from the results presented here. 
9 This post-hoc test is done throughout the results section where differences between experimental groups are analyzed. For 
full tables, see appendix A and B for results from both USA and Sweden. 
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Turning to H2, we focus on results among partisans that read policy information 
supported by out-parties. Democrats reading that the policy was endorsed by Republicans had 
a lower mean (5.19) compared to Democrats who got policy information without a party 
endorsement (5.67). Here, the difference balances on the edge of statistical significance if we 
would use a 90% significance level (t=-2.29, p=0.103). Also with Republicans, reading policy 
information supported by the out-party resulted in a lower mean (3.83) than reading policy 
information alone (3.98), but here the differences were clearly insignificant (t=-0.45, p=0.970).  
Taken together, the results show indications of lowering policy support when the policy 
is sponsored by out-parties. This is especially the case among Democrats, where mean policy 
support in the out-party group (group 3) is half a scale step lower than in the information group 
(group 2) and almost equal to the support in the control group. Again, the low variations among 
Republicans however make such indications less clear. However, the overall insignificant 
differences for both Democrats and Republicans provide no support in my results for H2 in the 
US case. 
 
Figure 1: Support for the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act divided by respondents identifying as 
Democrats and Republicans. The question asked was: Given the information you just read, what is your opinion 
about the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? Error bars represent significant level at 0.05. 
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Figure 2 displays the results of OLS regressions, which presents the mean policy support 
conditional on party identification and serves to graphically summarize the main takeaways 
from the two hypotheses. As indicated by the predicted lines, the figure shows that Democrats 
and Republicans show small indications of higher policy support when the policy is being 
endorsed by the in-party, while policy support from the out-party show indication of lowering 
support among respondents from both parties. However, the changes within respective party 
are insignificant.10 In sum, as no significant effects emerged of in- and out-party cues on climate 
policy support, the results found in the US case provided no support in this study for either of 
my two hypotheses.11  
The Eta squared was 0.004, meaning that 0,4 percent of the total variance in the policy 
support is explained by group differences, meaning that the experimental stimulus had no effect 
on the variance in climate policy support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
10 Same patterns emerged when separating respondents at levels of party attachment, i.e. how strongly they identified with their 
respective party. The analyses indicated that strong partisans responded more positively to in-party cues and more negatively 
to out-party cues compared to weak partisans, but the differences were insignificant and thus do not alter the main takeaways 
from the results. 
11 Although my study focuses on people identifying with political parties, I controlled the robustness of my findings by also 
analyzing subjects identifying as Independents (n=193). The results found that neither cues from Republicans (mean: 5.32) nor 
Democrats (mean: 4.78) made Independents significantly more supportive of the policy compared to Independents who only 
got policy information (mean: 4.60). This finding is in line with results presented for partisan identifiers, but the substantially 
higher support when the policy got Republican support is intriguing. Moreover, Independents with a Republican cue were 
significantly more positive to the policy compared to Independents in the control group (mean: 4.30) (t=3.06, p=0.013). Thus, 
it might be the case that non-partisans without deeply rooted party attachments are more affected by “surprising” sources of 
climate-related information that may have a stronger persuasive effect on opinions (Benegal & Scruggs, 2018). 
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Figure 2: Interaction plot where support for the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act is divided by 
respondents identifying as Democrats or Republicans. Analyses are done under control for ideological orientation, 
gender, age, education and income. Regression tables and coding of control variables are found in appendix. Error 
bars represent significant level at 0.05. 
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Study 2: Sweden 
To test my expectations in different contexts I designed a second study, which focuses on 
Sweden and the recently debated bonus-malus tax system for new cars.12 Also in the Swedish 
case, results displayed no support for H1. Left-wing party supporters13 reading that the policy 
was supported by Social Democrats had a higher mean (5.53) than leftists reading only reading 
policy information (5.06), a rather substantial but statistically insignificant difference (t=1.52, 
p=0.427). The same pattern emerged in a separate analysis of Social Democratic identifiers 
only.14 Social Democrats who got in-party cues and policy information had a higher mean 
(5.38) than Social Democrats who got policy information only (4.71), but this was also a 
statistically insignificant difference (t=1.51, p=0.432). Notable is that left-wing respondents in 
the control group had a higher mean (5.34) than left-wing respondents in the information only 
group and almost an equal mean as the group who read in-party cues and policy information. 
The differences were not substantive and insignificant, indicating a low effect of my treatments. 
Among right-wing respondents, the patterns held when they read in-party cues from the 
Moderate Party.15 16 Among supporters of the four right-wing parties, no significant effects of 
party cues emerged on policy support. The mean for right-wing party supporters who got in-
party cue and policy information was substantively higher (4.50) than the mean for respondents 
who got policy information (3.75), but insignificant (t=1.00, p=0.751). The highest mean 
support was however found in the control group (4.80), further indicating that the results were 
not in the expected direction. As observed also in the US case, this result means that in-party 
cues in combination with policy information did not result in a significantly higher policy 
support as hypothesized – a clear sign that my results did not support H1 in the Swedish case. 
Turning to H2, the results among Swedish respondents find no support for this. Left-wing 
party supporters in the Moderate cue condition had a lower mean (4.49) than left-wing 
                                                   
12 I reran the analyses with only those respondents who answered correctly on the attention check question (n = 240). The 
results from the separate analyses were not different from the results presented here. 
13 Here I refer to supporters of the three Red-Green parties with parliamentary representation in Sweden: The Social Democrats, 
the Left Party and the Green Party. 
14 I did this given the relative high number of self-identified Social Democrats in the sample (n = 110). I did not find a similar 
analysis for Moderates meaningful given the low number of Moderate identifiers (n = 16) and is therefore not reported. 
15 Here I refer to the four right-wing parties in the former Alliance: The Moderates, the Centre Party, the Christian Democrats 
and the Liberals. An additional analysis was performed including the fifth right-wing party in Swedish politics: The Sweden 
Democrats. The results from these analyses did not alter the results presented here. 
16 As the Alliance recently seized to exist at the national level when the liberal parties (the Centre Party & the Liberals) entered 
a budget cooperation with the Social Democrat/Green Party government coalition, I also performed analyses with the liberal 
parties and the conservative parties (the Moderates and the Christian Democrats) separately. While the liberal parties showed 
a higher mean score (5.28) compared to the conservative parties (3.90), the direction of results stayed the same and mean 
differences between groups remained insignificant, thus did not alter the results presented here. 
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supporters who only read policy information (5.06). While this is half a scale step difference in 
policy support and a considerably lower mean, also in comparison with the control group, it is 
insignificant (t=-1.84, p=0.260). Among right-wing supporters, the results surprisingly went in 
the opposite direction than expected. Right-wing party supporters had a substantively higher 
mean when the policy was endorsed by Social Democrats (4.69) than when only reading policy 
information (3.75). Despite a variation of almost one scale step between the groups and in clear 
violation with theoretical expectations, also these differences were insignificant (t=1.25, 
p=0.599). However, the problems with the Swedish sample is illustrated by the large confidence 
intervals in figure 3.  The small sample size, particularly among right-wing subjects, did not 
provide enough statistical power to draw any strong conclusions and makes my results very 
uncertain. 
 
Figure 3: Support for the bonus-malus policy divided by left-wing party identifiers (the Left Party, the Social 
Democrats, the Green Party) and right-wing party identifiers (the Centre Party, the Liberals, the Moderate Party, 
the Christian Democrats). The question asked was (translated into English): Given the information you just read, 
what is your opinion about introducing a bonus-malus policy for new cars? Error bars represent significant level 
at 0.05. 
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The differences between left-wing and right-wing party supporters when provided with 
cues from different parties are displayed by the interaction plot in figure 4. As the 
abovementioned results make clear, the results indicate that left-wing respondents behave as 
expected in response to both types of cues, but that right-wing respondents behave opposite to 
expectations. However, the low number of right-wing respondents and large confidence 
intervals within this group call for caution when interpreting the results.  
The Eta squared is 0.04, meaning that 4 percent of the total variance in the policy support 
is explained by group differences, meaning that the experimental stimulus had a small effect on 
the variance in climate policy support. Yet again, the low n among right-wing party identifiers 
call for a high level of caution when making conclusions from my results.  
 
Figure 4: Interaction plot where support for the bonus-malus policy is divided by respondents identifying as left-
wing and right-wing party supporters. Analyses are done under control for ideological orientation, gender, age, 
education and income. Regression tables and coding of control variables are found in appendix. Error bars 
represent significant level at 0.05. 
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Discussion 
This study has discussed the potential for political parties to lead public opinion and shape 
citizen preferences for climate policies. As political parties are central actors in the formation 
of domestic climate policy, their potential for shaping public opinion and increasing public 
support for policies aimed at addressing climate change is an important question for democratic 
societies when building robust climate mitigation policies. I addressed a limitation in previous 
research by bringing in the key domestic political actors in the study of how citizens shape their 
climate policy opinions. 
Through survey experiments I investigated how party cues and policy information affect 
opinions of two recent climate policy initiatives in USA and Sweden. Experimental findings 
did not find that party cues in combination with policy information increased citizens’ support 
for policies aimed at mitigating climate change. In both studies, no significant increases in 
climate policy support were found among citizens who read policy information about a policy 
that was supported by their political party compared to citizens who only read policy 
information. Moreover, when reading policy information about a policy endorsed by an out-
party citizens showed indication of lowering policy support. The fact that I find consistent 
evidence across the two different political contexts studied here is reassuring. But as neither of 
my two hypotheses were supported in this study, the results contradict abundant research 
findings suggesting elite rhetoric’s large influence on policy opinions. 
The results from this thesis therefore dampens the hopes potentially put on the 
possibilities of parties to lead environmental opinion. It is ultimately political parties that are in 
control of the legislative and governmental powers to convert citizens’ demands into political 
action. The evidence presented here is not encouraging for political parties’ potential to increase 
public acceptance of concrete climate policy action. My results also raise the concern that not 
only do in-party cues not raise policy support much, but out-party cues show indication of 
lowering policy support. (cf. Nicholson, 2012).  
The results must nonetheless be considered in light of the chosen sampling approach. All 
participants were self-recruited and the number of participants rather low, especially in the 
Swedish study. In light of the chosen data collection strategy and the big confidence intervals, 
which were prominent in the Swedish case, the results must be treated with caution. Since this 
thesis found its departure in the limited attention given by previous work to the role of political 
parties in citizens’ climate policy attitudes, my results also demonstrate the need for 
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supplementary studies that test the robustness of my theoretical assumptions and empirical 
findings, preferably with population-based samples.  
An important aspect raised in this study was how people of different partisan stripes 
respond to party cues and policy information. A question that arises from the results is to what 
extent people are affected by their perceptions of party credibility on climate issues. As the 
policies were related to climate and environment, a policy area in which left-leaning green or 
left parties typically possess issue ownership and take stronger positions in relation to climate 
change (Farstad, 2018), it may not be surprising that the results indicated stronger climate 
policy support among left-wing respondents than right-wing respondents. Among left-wing 
respondents in both studies (i.e. Democrats in the US), the absence of any significant effects of 
party cues compared to when receiving only policy information may indicate that left-wing 
respondents are not persuaded by party signaling on the climate but are rather positive to climate 
action nonetheless, as their relatively high means in both countries indicate.  
Similar dynamics might be in play among right-wing respondents, who typically are less 
demanding of strong climate action and arguably need more persuasion to embrace more 
forceful climate policies. The null results among right-wing respondents indicate that they did 
not find the experimental stimulus convincing enough to become persuaded about the policies’ 
usefulness, which might be attributed to the lack of information about the policies’ economic 
consequences or clearer estimations of their effectiveness. Such information has elsewhere been 
shown to affect policy acceptance (Jagers et al., 2018). Further, increasing ideological 
polarization related to climate issues, especially in the US (Ehret et al., 2018; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011), also begs the question whether political parties at all can mobilize stronger 
climate support among right-wing citizens. The current state of the political debate may simply 
make it too challenging for strong climate policies to be resolutely supported by right-wing 
political elites. This circumstance clearly dampens the potential for those political actors to lead 
their voters into embracing such policies.  
Still, some caution is in order when drawing out the implications of the results. The 
discussion above call for scrutiny of my experimental design. I used comparatively week 
treatments in the variation of party cues and policy information. On the one hand this was 
deemed reasonable for preserving experimental realism and maintaining subjects’ attention to 
my experimental vignettes, but clearly had limited impact on subjects. The cues stated that a 
party supported the policy, but neither any statements from party representatives nor arguments 
(“frames”) in which the party further explained their policy position (Slothuus & de Vreese, 
2010). As parties often make citizens aware of their policy positions by providing clear 
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arguments for them, an alternative operationalization of party cues that contained explanations 
of their position could more strongly have affected peoples’ opinions.  
It could also be the case that citizens respond differently to party cues in other formats 
than text. Reading a statement connected to a party label might stimulate negative feelings 
regardless of identification. Other forms of treatments, for instance by short ads or video clips 
where a party representative explain the party’s policy position, may be alternative, fruitful 
operationalizations that might not stimulate potential negative feelings as much as written party 
labels. Moreover, as my choice of design did not control for any pre-treatment effects, 
respondents’ pre-existing policy knowledge and opinions on the effectiveness of the two 
policies studied were not measured but is clearly a factor that people may take into 
consideration when they form climate policy opinions. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has investigated the potentials for political parties to lead public opinion on arguably 
the most important question facing contemporary societies: climate change policy. Two survey 
experiments were performed on citizens in USA and Sweden, two countries where political 
elites have undertaken distinctive approaches to climate change and climate mitigation policies. 
Results found no support that political parties were able to lead citizens into becoming 
more accepting of policies aimed at mitigating climate change. In neither country my 
experiments found that citizens were more supportive of climate policies when they got in-
party cues in combination with policy information compared to citizens who only got policy 
information. Moreover, when reading policy information about a policy endorsed by an out-
party citizens showed indication of lowering policy support. The results from this study fall in 
line with previous studies that find relatively small effects of party cues on opinion formation 
(Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2014; Bullock, 2011).  
This thesis contributes to a long-standing research field on political parties’ influence on 
citizens’ opinions. The findings presented in this thesis indicate that parties fail to lead public 
climate opinion in a more positive direction. As the consequences of climate change only 
recently have begun to cast its marks around the world, the effects of various mitigation policies 
at the governments’ disposal are at best ambiguous. However, it remains the case that political 
parties should provide arguments to the electorate for the policies they find appropriate. In order 
to successfully lead public opinion, I believe political actors must make deeper reflections on 
how arguments in favor of policies aimed at confronting the challenges of climate change 
should be formulated. The question if and how political parties can channel a growing, but still 
rather abstract, public demand for climate action into support for concrete policies remains a 
dauting task for researchers and policymakers. Importantly, recent developments also raise the 
opposite question: can public opinion lead the political elites in the right direction and make 
political parties act to meet a growing public demand for climate action? In this regard, the 
short- and long-term effects of recent climate mobilizations on party behavior provide an 
interesting path for future research. 
As mentioned in the discussion, further studies using population-based samples and more 
high-quality data collection techniques are needed for assessing the theoretical assumptions 
raised in this thesis. It is also the case that my theoretical assumptions could be more thoroughly 
empirically scrutinized with other experimental designs. I believe conjoint experiments (e.g. 
Dermont, 2019) is a methodologically fruitful way forward. As my information treatments 
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contained rather short descriptions of policy design and expected environmental benefits, a 
conjoint approach would enable an investigation of varieties in policy information and party 
cues by assessing which elements of a given policy and its source that influence support for the 
policy. This could help us understand what specific aspects of policy information that drive 
citizen opinions more in favor of such policies. 
Additionally, an interesting avenue of further research concerns which parties are able to 
shape climate opinions. As the chosen party cues in the US were natural given its two-party 
system, the Swedish study contained cues from the two major parties; the Social Democrats 
and the Moderates. Those parties are neither main opponents on climate issues nor are 
environmental issues central to the parties’ raison d'être. While climate leadership arguably is 
more needed from big political parties at the heart of domestic political space - who form 
governments and shape governments’ agendas on climate politics - they may not be the parties 
that have mobilizing potential around these issues. Whether smaller parties with more distinct 
(pro-/anti)-environmental profiles, parties with higher levels of environmental issue ownership 
or if bipartisan cues, where several parties indicate their support for a particular policy action, 
would provide stronger effects on climate opinions should be pursued by future research.  
Conclusively, the main takeaway from this thesis is that political parties face an uphill 
battle in leading public opinion into becoming more supportive of climate policy action. The 
results therefore call into question political parties’ ability to lead environmental opinion. 
Hence, the potential for climate leadership by political parties is subject to challenging 
constraints that may affect the prospects of dealing with the daunting challenge of climate 
change. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Results from USA 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of climate policy support over different experimental groups (Democrats) 
 
 
 
What is your opinion about the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? (1=Strongly oppose, 7=Strongly support) 
       
Group N Mean Std. dev. Std. err 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
       
Control 75 5.12 1.22 .14 4.84 5.40 
Information 85 5.67 1.36 .15 5.38 5.97 
Right cue + information 94 5.19 1.48 .15 4.89 5.50 
Left cue + information 86 5.59 1.47 .16 5.28 5.91 
       
Total 340 5.39 1.70 .15 5.10 5.70 
 
 
 
Table 3: ANOVA (Democrats)      
What is your opinion about the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? (1=Strongly oppose, 7=Strongly support) 
       
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Prob>F (sig)  
Between Groups 19.392 3 6.463 3.30 0.0206  
Within Groups 658.005 336 1.958    
       
Total 677.397 339 1.998    
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Table 4: Tukey Post-Hoc test (Democrats) 
      
 Mean difference Std.Err t Sig 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Experimental group       
       
Information vs Control 0.55 0.22 2.48 0.064 -0,02 1.12 
Rep+Information vs Control 0.07 0.22 0.33 0.988 -0,49 0.63 
Dem+Information vs Control 0.47 0.22 2.14 0.143 -0,98 1.04 
Rep+Information vs Information -0,48 0.21 -2,29 0.103 -1,02 0.06 
Dem+Information vs Information -0,08 0.21 -0,36 0.984 -0,63 0.48 
Dem+Information vs Rep+Information 0.40 0.21 1.92 0.220 -0,14 0.94 
 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of climate policy support over different experimental groups (Republicans) 
 
 
 
What is your opinion about the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? (1=Strongly oppose, 7=Strongly support) 
       
Group N Mean Std. dev. Std. err 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
       
Control 49 4.08 1.55 .22 3.64 4.53 
Information 54 3.98 1.90 .26 3.46 4.50 
Right cue + information 51 4.08 1.87 .26 3.55 4.61 
Left cue + information 60 3.83 1.71 .22 3.39 4.27 
       
Total 214 3.99 1.75 .24 3.51 4.48 
 
 
Table 6: ANOVA (Republicans)      
What is your opinion about the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? (1=Strongly oppose, 7=Strongly support) 
       
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Prob>F (sig)  
Between Groups 2.283 3 0.761 0.24 0.865  
Within Groups 654.674 210 3.117    
       
Total 656.957 213 3.084    
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Table 7: Tukey Post-Hoc test (Republicans) 
      
 Mean difference Std.Err t Sig 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Experimental group       
       
Information vs Control -0,1 0.35 -0,29 0.992 -1 0.80 
Rep+Information vs Control 0 0.35 -0,01 1.000 -0,92 0.91 
Dem+Information vs Control -0,25 0.34 -0,73 0.885 -1,13 0.63 
Rep+Information vs Information 0,1 0.33 0.28 0.992 -0,8 0.99 
Dem+Information vs Information -0,15 0.33 -0,45 0.970 -1 0.71 
Dem+Information vs Rep+Information -0,25 0.34 -0,73 0.885 -1,16 0.63 
 
 
Table 8 – OLS 
regression Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Republican cue -0.070 (0.164) 
-0.137 
(0.150) 
-0.284 
(0.188) 
-0.228 
(0.185) 
Republican identifier  -1.416*** (0.136) 
-1.519*** 
(0.157) 
-0.728*** 
(0.218) 
Republican cue x 
Republican identifier 
  0.405 
(0.313) 
0.451 
(0.308) 
 
Intercept 
 
Observations 
 
Adjusted R2 
4.870*** 
(0.084) 
 
554 
 
-0.001 
5.435*** 
(0.094) 
 
554 
 
0.162  
5.476*** 
(0.099) 
 
554 
 
0.163 
6.217*** 
(0.373) 
 
554 
 
0.202 
    CONTROLS NO NO NO YES 
Comments: Unstandardized beta-coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. The variable 
“Republican identifier” indicates whether respondents identified with the Republican party (0=No, 1=Yes). Control variables included in model 
4: ideological orientation, gender, age, education, income. All coefficients for the control variables (except ideological orientation) were 
insignificant. 
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Table 9 – OLS 
regression Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Democrat cue 0.024 (0.164) 
0.072 
(0.150) 
0.262 
(0.194) 
0.360 
(0.190) 
Republican identifier  -1.413*** (0.136) 
-1.285*** 
(0.159) 
-0.413 
(0.228) 
Democrat cue x 
Republican identifier 
  -0.474 
(0.306) 
-0.605* 
(0.302) 
Intercept 
 
 
Observations 
 
Adjusted R2 
4.846*** 
(0.084) 
 
554 
 
-0.002 
          5.379*** 
(0.093) 
 
554 
 
0.161  
  5.331*** 
(0.098) 
 
554 
 
0.163 
 6.106*** 
(0.375) 
 
554 
 
0.205 
CONTROLS NO NO NO YES 
Comments: Unstandardized beta-coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. The variable 
“Republican identifier” indicates whether respondents identified with the Republican party (0=No, 1=Yes). Control variables included in model 
4: ideological orientation, gender, age, education, income. All coefficients for the control variables (except ideological orientation) were 
insignificant. 
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Appendix B: Results from Sweden 
 
 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of climate policy support over different experimental groups  
(left-wing parties) 
 
 
 
What is your opinion about the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? (1=Strongly oppose, 7=Strongly support) 
       
Group N Mean Std. dev. Std. err 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
       
Control 50 5.34 1.70 .24 4.86 5.82 
Information 53 5.06 1.46 .20 4.65 5.46 
(M) cue + information 49 4.49 1.63 .23 4.02 4.96 
(S) cue + information 52 5.52 1.43 .20 5.12 5.92 
       
Total 204 5.10 1.56 .22 4.66 5.54 
 
 
 
Table 11: ANOVA (left-wing parties)      
What is your opinion about the Bonus-Malus policy? (1=Strongly oppose, 7=Strongly support) 
       
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Prob>F (sig)  
Between Groups 30.352 3 10.117 4.17 0.007  
Within Groups 485.276 200 2.426    
       
Total 515.627 203 2.540    
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Table 12: Tukey Post-Hoc test  
(left-wing parties)  
     
 Mean difference Std.Err t Sig 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Experimental group       
       
Information vs Control -0,28 0.31 -0,92 0.793 -1,08 0.51 
M+Information vs Control -0,85 0.31 -2,72 0.036 -1,66 -0,04 
S+Information vs Control 0.18 0.31 0,58 0.938 -0,62 0.98 
M+Information vs Information -0,57 0.31 -1,84 0.260 -1,37 0.23 
S+Information vs Information 0.46 0.30 1,52 0.427 -0,33 1.25 
S+Information vs M+Information 1.03 0.31 3,32 0.006 0.23 1.83 
 
 
 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics of climate policy support over different experimental groups  
(right-wing parties) 
 
 
 
What is your opinion about the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? (1=Strongly oppose, 7=Strongly support) 
       
Group N Mean Std. dev. Std. err 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
       
Control 15 4.80 1.74 .45 3.84 5.76 
Information 8 3.75 2.38 .84 1.76 5.74 
(M) cue + information 16 4.50 1.32 .33 3.80 5.20 
(S) cue + information 16 4.69 1.74 .44 3.76 5.61 
       
Total       55 4.43 1.80 .52 3.29 5.58 
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Table 14: ANOVA (right-wing 
parties)      
What is your opinion about the Bonus-Malus policy?  (1=Strongly oppose, 7=Strongly support) 
       
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Prob>F (sig)  
Between Groups 6.372 3 2.124 0.71 0.553  
Within Groups 153.338 51 3.006    
       
Total 159.709 54 2.958    
       
 
Table 15: Tukey Post-Hoc test  
(right-wing parties) 
      
 Mean difference Std.Err t Sig 
95% CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
Experimental group       
       
Information vs Control -1,05 0.76 -1,38 0.516 -3,07 0.97 
M+Information vs Control -0,3 0.62 -0,48 0.963 -1,96 1.36 
S+Information vs Control -1,13 0.62 -0,18 0.998 -1,77 1.54 
M+Information vs Information 0,75 0.75 1.00 0.751 -1,24 2.74 
S+Information vs Information 0,94 0.75 1.25 0.599 -1,06 2.93 
S+Information vs M+Information 0,19 0.61 0.31 0.990 -1,44 1.82 
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Table 16 – OLS 
regression Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Moderate cue -0.657** (0.231) 
-0.632** 
(0.230) 
-0.813** 
(0.262) 
-0.686* 
(0.268) 
Right-wing identifier  -0.548* (0.243) 
-0.765** 
(0.286) 
-0.335 
(0.419) 
Moderate cue x 
Right-wing identifier 
  0.775 
(0.542) 
0.541 
(0.552) 
Intercept 
 
 
Observations 
 
Adjusted R2 
5.149*** 
(0.116) 
 
259 
 
0.027 
5.260*** 
(0.125) 
 
259 
 
0.042  
5.303*** 
(0.128) 
 
259 
 
0.046 
5.063*** 
(0.770) 
 
259 
 
0.062 
CONTROLS NO NO NO YES 
Comments: Unstandardized beta-coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. The variable “Right-
wing identifier” indicates whether respondents identified with one of the four right-wing parties (0=No, 1=Yes). Control variables included in 
model 4: ideological orientation, gender, age, education, income. All coefficients for the control variables were insignificant. 
 
 
Table 17 – OLS 
regression Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Social Democrat cue 0.460* (0.230) 
0.478* 
(0.228) 
0.552* 
(0.259) 
0.474 
(0.259) 
Right-wing identifier  -0.598* (0.245) 
-0.506 
(0.288) 
-0.158 
(0.401) 
Social Democrat cue x 
Right-wing identifier 
  -0.326 
(0.544) 
-0.145 
(0.545) 
Intercept 
 
 
Observations 
 
Adjusted R2 
4.864*** 
(0.118) 
 
259 
 
0.012 
4.986*** 
(0.127) 
 
259 
 
0.030  
4.967*** 
(0.131) 
 
259 
 
0.028 
4.816*** 
(0.786) 
 
259 
 
0.051 
CONTROLS NO NO NO YES 
Comments: Unstandardized beta-coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. The variable “Right-
wing identifier” indicates whether respondents identified with one of the four right-wing parties (0=No, 1=Yes). Control variables included in 
model 4: ideological orientation, gender, age, education, income. All coefficients for the control variables were insignificant. 
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Appendix C: Randomization check 
 
Comments: Table display mean scores with N in parentheses. Party: 0=Democrat, 1=Republican. Party attachment: 1=Strong Democrat, 
2=Weak Democrat, 3=Lean Democrat, 4=Neither Democrat nor Republican, 5=Lean Republican, 6=Weak Republican, 7=Strong Republican. 
Ideology: 1=Very liberal, 2=Mostly liberal, 3=Somewhat liberal, 4=Neither liberal nor conservative, 5=Somewhat conservative, 6=Mostly 
conservative, 7=Very conservative. Gender: 0=Male, 1=Female, 2=Other. Age: 1=Under 18, 2=18-24, 3=25-34, 4=35-44, 5=45-54, 6=55-64, 
7=65 or older. Education: 1=Less than high school, 2=High school, 3=Some college, 4=2 year college degree, 5=4 year college degree, 
6=Doctorate. Income: 1=$1000 or less, 2=$1000-1999, 3=$2000-2999, 4=$3000-3999, 5=$4000-4999, 6=$5000-5999, 7=$6000 or more. 
 
Comments: Table display mean scores with N in parentheses. Party: 1=Left Party, 2=Social Democrats, 3=Centre Party, 4=Liberal Party, 
5=Moderate Party, 6=Christian Democrats, 7=Green Party, 8=Sweden Democrats. Party attachment: 0=Not at all close, 1=Somewhat close, 
2=Very close. Ideology: 1=Clearly to the left, 5=Neither left nor right, 10=Clearly to the right. Gender: 0=Male, 1=Female, 2=Other. Age: 
1=Under 18, 2=18-24, 3=25-34, 4=35-44, 5=45-54, 6=55-64, 7=65 or older. Education: 1=Elementary school, 2=High school, 3=University 
(bachelor level), 4=University (advanced level) 5=Doctorate level. Income: 1=Less than 10 000 SEK, 2=10-19 999 SEK, 3=20-29 999 SEK, 
4=30-39 999 SEK, 5=40-49 999 SEK, 6=50-59 999 SEK, 7=60 000 SEK or more. 
Table 18: Randomization check (US sample)     
Control factors Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Grand mean Sig F 
Party 0.40 (124) 0.39 (139) 0.35 (145) 0.41 (146) 0.39 (554) 0.931 0.01   
Party attachment 3.31 (124) 3.40 (139) 3.40 (145) 3.65 (146) 3.45 (554) 0.110 1.74      
Ideology 3.60 (124) 3.34 (139) 3.67 (145) 3.76 (146) 3.60 (554) 0.029  2.37     
Gender 0.53 (124) 0.55 (139) 0.53 (145) 0.55 (146) 0.54 (554) 0.873  0.03     
Age  3.93 (124) 3.80 (139) 4.03 (145) 3.92 (146) 3.92 (554) 0.399  1.03    
Education 4.39 (124) 4.25 (139) 4.28 (145) 4.14 (146) 4.26 (554) 0.098   1.87      
Income 3.66 (124) 4.00 (139) 3.98 (145) 4.04 (146) 3.93 (554)  0.581   0.79  
Total N 124 139 145 146 554   
Table 19: Randomization check (Swedish sample)     
Control factors Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Grand mean Sig F 
Party 3.06 (65) 2.92 (65) 3.34 (65) 2.93 (69) 3.06 (264) 0.731 0.63   
Party attachment 1.18 (65) 1.20 (65) 1.20 (65) 1.26 (69) 1.21 (264) 0.545 0.61     
Ideology 3.08 (65) 2.88 (65) 3.34 (65) 2.81 (69) 3.02 (264) 0.588  0.84    
Gender 0.58 (65) 0.49 (65) 0.68 (65) 0.59 (69) 0.59 (264) 0.762  0.27     
Age  3.48 (65) 3.74 (65) 3.72 (65) 3.52 (69) 3.61 (264) 0.353  1.12     
Education 4.34 (65) 4.34 (65) 4.18 (65) 4.23 (69) 4.27 (264) 0.097   1.99      
Income 2.78 (65) 2.97 (65) 2.97 (65) 2.88 (69) 2.90 (264)  0.770   0.55    
Total N 65 65 65 69 264   
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Appendix D: Survey USA 
 
Welcome to this short survey about a recent climate policy proposal. The survey will only take 2-3 minutes to complete. Be 
assured that all answers you provide will be kept in the strictest confidentiality. 
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican or an Independent? 
o Democrat  (0)  
o Republican  (1)  
o Independent  (2)  
 
What is the strength of your party identification? 
o Strong Democrat  (1)  
o Weak Democrat  (2)  
o Lean Democrat  (3)  
o Independent  (4)  
o Lean Republican  (5)  
o Weak Republican  (6)  
o Strong Republican  (7)  
 
Which point on this scale best describes your political views? 
o Very liberal  (1)  
o Mostly liberal  (2)  
o Somewhat liberal  (3)  
o Neither liberal nor conservative  (4)  
o Somewhat conservative  (5)  
o Mostly conservative  (6)  
o Very conservative  (7)  
 
What is your gender? 
o Male  (0)  
o Female  (1)  
o Other  (2)  
 
What is your age? 
o Under 18  (1)  
o 18-24  (2)  
o 25-34  (3)  
o 35-44  (4)  
o 45-54  (5)  
o 55-64  (6)  
o 65 or older  (7)  
 
     
  56 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? If you are currently enrolled in an education, please indicate the 
level of that education. 
o Less than high school  (1)  
o High school  (2)  
o Some college  (3)  
o 2 year college degree  (4)  
o 4 year college degree  (5)  
o Doctorate  (6)  
 
What is your monthly income (before taxes)? 
o $1000 or less  (1)  
o $1000-1999  (2)  
o $2000-2999  (3)  
o $3000-3999  (4)  
o $4000-4999  (5)  
o $5000-5999  (6)  
o $6000 or more  (7)  
 
 
[Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of the following four conditions] 
 
Group 1 (control condition) 
Next, we would like to know your opinion about a recent climate policy proposal. The Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend 
Act is a recently introduced bill by politicians to put a national price on carbon. 
 
Given the information you just read, what is your opinion about the The Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? 
 
Group 2 (information only condition) 
Next, we would like to know your opinion about a recent climate policy proposal. The Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend 
Act is a recently introduced bill by politicians to put a national price on carbon. The bill would set a carbon price for fossil fuel 
companies at $15 per ton of carbon emissions and increasing the price by $10 every year, while 100% of the revenues would 
be returned to American households. According to research, the policy would reduce US carbon emissions by 45 percent by 
2030 and up to 80 percent by 2050, compared to 2015, as well as abolish the use of coal in the US electricity system by 2030. 
 
Given the information you just read, what is your opinion about the The Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? 
 
Group 3 (Republican cue + information) 
Next, we would like to know your opinion about a recent climate policy proposal. The Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend 
Act is a recently introduced bill by Republicans to put a national price on carbon. The bill would set a carbon price for fossil fuel 
companies at $15 per ton of carbon emissions and increasing the price by $10 every year, while 100% of the revenues would 
be returned to American households. According to research the policy, that is supported by Republicans, would reduce US 
carbon emissions by 45 percent by 2030 and up to 80 percent by 2050, compared to 2015, as well as abolish the use of coal in 
the US electricity system by 2030. 
Given the information you just read, what is your opinion about the The Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? 
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Group 4 (Democrat cue + information) 
Next, we would like to know your opinion about a recent climate policy proposal. The Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend 
Act is a recently introduced bill by Democrats to put a national price on carbon. The bill would set a carbon price for fossil fuel 
companies at $15 per ton of carbon emissions and increasing the price by $10 every year, while 100% of the revenues would 
be returned to American households. According to research the policy, that is supported by Democrats, would reduce US 
carbon emissions by 45 percent by 2030 and up to 80 percent by 2050, compared to 2015, as well as abolish the use of coal in 
the US electricity system by 2030. 
 
 
Given the information you just read, what is your opinion about the The Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? 
o Strongly oppose  (1)  
o 2  (2)  
o 3  (3)  
o Neither oppose nor support  (4)  
o 5  (5)  
o 6  (6)  
o Strongly support (7)  
 
In the text you just read, what party expressed support for the The Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act? 
o Democrats  (1)  
o Republicans  (2)  
o Unclear  (3)  
 
Start of Block: Random ID 
 
Here is your ID: ${e://Field/Random%20ID} 
 
 
Copy this value to paste into MTurk. 
 
 
When you have copied this ID, please click the next button to submit your survey. 
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Appendix E: Survey Sweden 
 
Välkommen till denna enkät vars syfte är att undersöka hur personer formar miljöpolitiska attityder. Har du frågor om studien 
kontakta Felix Andersson på gusfelian@student.gu.se. Klicka på pilen nedan för att börja enkäten. 
Vilket parti anser du dig stå närmast? 
o Vänsterpartiet  (1)  
o Socialdemokraterna  (2)  
o Centerpartiet  (3)  
o Liberalerna  (4)  
o Moderaterna  (5)  
o Kristdemokraterna  (6)  
o Miljöpartiet  (7)  
o Sverigedemokraterna  (8)  
o Annat  (9)  
 
Hur nära upplever du dig stå detta parti? 
o Inte alls nära  (0)  
o Ganska nära  (1)  
o Mycket nära  (2)  
 
Man talar ibland om att politiska åsikter kan placeras in på en vänster–högerskala. Var någonstans skulle du placera dig själv 
på en sådan skala?  
o Klart till vänster  (0)  
o 2  (1)  
o 3  (2)  
o 4  (3)  
o 5  (4)  
o Varken vänster eller höger  (5)  
o 7  (6)  
o 8  (7)  
o 9  (8)  
o 10  (9)  
o Klart till höger  (10)  
 
 
Vilket kön tillhör du? 
o Man  (0)  
o Kvinna  (1)  
o Annat  (2)  
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Vilken är din ålder? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Vilken skolutbildning har du? Om du ännu inte avslutat din utbildning, markera den du genomgår för närvarande. 
o Ej avslutad grundskola  (1)  
o Grundskola  (2)  
o Gymnasieskola  (3)  
o Universitet/högskola, grundnivå  (4)  
o Universitet/högskola, avancerad nivå  (5)  
o Forskarutbildning  (6)  
 
Hur stor är din egen månadsinkomst före skatt? 
o Mindre än 10 000 kronor  (1)  
o 10-19 999 kronor  (2)  
o 20-29 999 kronor  (3)  
o 30-39 999 kronor  (4)  
o 40-49 999 kronor  (5)  
o 50-59 999 kronor  (6)  
o 60 000 kronor eller mer  (7)  
 
 
[Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions] 
 
Group 1 (Control condition) 
Härnäst är jag intresserad av din åsikt om ett aktuellt klimatpolitiskt förslag. Vissa politiker har föreslagit ett bonus-malus system 
för nya bilar, vilket innebär att nya bilar beskattas utifrån utsläppsnivå. 
Givet informationen du just läste, vad är din åsikt om att införa ett bonus-malus system för nya bilar? 
 
Group 2 (information only condition) 
Härnäst är jag intresserad av din åsikt om ett aktuellt klimatpolitiskt förslag. Vissa politiker har föreslagit ett bonus-malus system 
för nya bilar, vilket innebär att nya bilar beskattas utifrån utsläppsnivå. Enligt förslaget kommer nya bilar med noll eller relativt 
låga koldioxidutsläpp att premieras med en bonus på maximalt 60 000 kronor, medan nya bensin- och dieseldrivna bilar med 
relativt höga koldioxidutsläpp kommer att få en förhöjd fordonsskatt under de tre första åren. Enligt forskning kommer förslaget 
att reducera utsläppen från nya bilar i snabbare takt än tidigare samt minska koldioxidutsläppen med fyra miljoner ton och 
kväveoxidutsläppen med tre tusen ton till år 2030.   
Givet informationen du just läste, vad är din åsikt om att införa ett bonus-malus system för nya bilar? 
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Group 3 (Moderate cue + information) 
Härnäst är jag intresserad av din åsikt om ett aktuellt klimatpolitiskt förslag. Moderaterna har föreslagit ett bonus-malus system 
för nya bilar, vilket innebär att nya bilar beskattas utifrån utsläppsnivå. Enligt förslaget kommer nya bilar med noll eller relativt 
låga koldioxidutsläpp att premieras med en bonus på maximalt 60 000 kronor, medan nya bensin- och dieseldrivna bilar med 
relativt höga koldioxidutsläpp kommer att få en förhöjd fordonsskatt under de tre första åren. Enligt forskning kommer förslaget, 
som stöds av Moderaterna, att reducera utsläppen från nya bilar i snabbare takt än tidigare samt minska koldioxidutsläppen 
med fyra miljoner ton och kväveoxidutsläppen med tre tusen ton till år 2030. 
Givet informationen du just läste, vad är din åsikt om att införa ett bonus-malus system för nya bilar? 
 
Group 4 (Social Democrat cue + information) 
Härnäst är jag intresserad av din åsikt om ett aktuellt klimatpolitiskt förslag. Socialdemokraterna har föreslagit ett bonus-malus 
system för nya bilar, vilket innebär att nya bilar beskattas utifrån utsläppsnivå. Enligt förslaget kommer nya bilar med noll eller 
relativt låga koldioxidutsläpp att premieras med en bonus på maximalt 60 000 kronor, medan nya bensin- och dieseldrivna bilar 
med relativt höga koldioxidutsläpp kommer att få en förhöjd fordonsskatt under de tre första åren. Enligt forskning kommer 
förslaget, som stöds av Socialdemokraterna, att reducera utsläppen från nya bilar i snabbare takt än tidigare samt minska 
koldioxidutsläppen med fyra miljoner ton och kväveoxidutsläppen med tre tusen ton till år 2030. 
 
Givet informationen du just läste, vad är din åsikt om att införa ett bonus-malus system för nya bilar? 
o Starkt emot förslaget  (1)  
o 2  (2)  
o 3  (3)  
o Varken för eller emot förslaget  (4)  
o 5  (5)  
o 6  (6)  
o Starkt för förslaget  (7)  
 
Vilket parti uttryckte i texten stöd för att införa ett bonus-malus system för nya bilar? 
o Socialdemokraterna  (1)  
o Moderaterna  (2)  
o Det framgick inte  (3)  
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Appendix F: Survey Sweden (translated into English) 
 
Welcome to this survey whose purpose is to study how people form climate policy opinions. If you have any questions about the 
study, please contact Felix Andersson at gusfelian@student.gu.se. Click on the arrow below to start the survey. 
What party do you feel closest to? 
o Left Party (1)  
o Social Democrats (2)  
o Centre Party (3)  
o Liberal Party  (4)  
o The Moderates  (5)  
o Christian Democrats  (6)  
o Green Party  (7)  
o Sweden Democrats  (8)  
o Other (9)  
 
How closely to you identify with this party? 
o Not close at all  (0)  
o Somewhat close  (1)  
o Very close  (2)  
 
It is sometimes said that political views can be placed on a left-right scale. Where would you place yourself on such a scale? 
o Clearly to the left  (0)  
o 2  (1)  
o 3  (2)  
o 4  (3)  
o 5  (4)  
o Neither left nor right  (5)  
o 7  (6)  
o 8  (7)  
o 9  (8)  
o 10  (9)  
o Clearly to the right  (10)  
 
 
What gender do you identify with? 
o Male  (0)  
o Female  (1)  
o Other (2)  
 
 
     
  62 
 
What is your age? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
What level of education do you have? If you have not finished your education, please indicate the education you are currently 
enrolled in. 
o Not finished elementary school  (1)  
o Elementary school (2)  
o High school  (3)  
o University, bachelor level  (4)  
o University, advanced level  (5)  
o Doctorate  (6)  
 
What is your monthly income before taxes? 
o Less than 10 000 SEK  (1)  
o 10-19 999 SEK  (2)  
o 20-29 999 SEK  (3)  
o 30-39 999 SEK (4)  
o 40-49 999 SEK  (5)  
o 50-59 999 SEK  (6)  
o 60 000 SEK or more  (7)  
 
 
[Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions] 
 
Group 1 (Control condition) 
Next, I am interested in your opinion on a recent climate policy proposal. Some politicians have proposed a bonus-malus system 
for new cars, which means that new cars are taxed based on their levels of emissions. 
Given the information you just read, what is your opinion of introducing a bonus-malus policy for new cars? 
 
Group 2 (information only condition) 
Next, I am interested in your opinion on a recent climate policy proposal. Some politicians have proposed a bonus-malus system 
for new cars, which means that new cars are taxed based on their levels of emissions. According to the proposal, new cars with 
no or relatively low carbon emissions will be rewarded with a bonus of maximum SEK 60,000, while new petrol and diesel cars 
with relatively high carbon emissions will receive an increased vehicle tax during the first three years. According to research, the 
proposal will reduce emissions from new cars at a faster rate than before and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by four million 
tonnes and nitrogen oxide emissions by three thousand tonnes by 2030. 
Given the information you just read, what is your opinion of introducing a bonus-malus policy for new cars? 
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Group 3 (Moderate cue + information) 
Next, I am interested in your opinion on a recent climate policy proposal. The Moderates has proposed a bonus-malus system for 
new cars, which means that new cars are taxed based on their levels of emissions. According to the proposal, new cars with no 
or relatively low carbon emissions will be rewarded with a bonus of maximum SEK 60,000, while new petrol and diesel cars with 
relatively high carbon emissions will receive an increased vehicle tax during the first three years. According to research the 
proposal, that is supported by the Moderates, will reduce emissions from new cars at a faster rate than before and reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions by four million tonnes and nitrogen oxide emissions by three thousand tonnes by 2030. 
Given the information you just read, what is your opinion of introducing a bonus-malus policy for new cars? 
 
Group 4 (Social Democrat cue + information) 
Next, I am interested in your opinion on a recent climate policy proposal. The Social Democrats has proposed a bonus-malus 
system for new cars, which means that new cars are taxed based on their levels of emissions. According to the proposal, new 
cars with no or relatively low carbon emissions will be rewarded with a bonus of maximum SEK 60,000, while new petrol and 
diesel cars with relatively high carbon emissions will receive an increased vehicle tax during the first three years. According to 
research the proposal, that is supported by the Social Democrats, will reduce emissions from new cars at a faster rate than before 
and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by four million tonnes and nitrogen oxide emissions by three thousand tonnes by 2030. 
Given the information you just read, what is your opinion of introducing a bonus-malus policy for new cars? 
o Strongly oppose  (1)  
o 2  (2)  
o 3  (3)  
o Neither oppose nor support  (4)  
o 5  (5)  
o 6  (6)  
o Strongly support  (7)  
 
What party in the text expressed support for the bonus-malus policy? 
o Social Democrats (1)  
o Moderates  (2)  
o Unclear  (3)  
